The Palestinian Narrative: who benefits?

In the early 1970s the Arab side in the Israel-Arab dispute won a great victory in world public opinion, by redefining the way the world viewed the problem.

Until then, most people accepted the Zionist narrative, in which a couple of million Jews living in a poor, tiny territory were facing over 100 million Arabs living across millions of square miles of territory, blessed with staggeringly large oil resources. In the 1970s, most people in the world came to accept the Arab narrative: the Jews were fighting not a vast Arab monolith, but a group of people even smaller and poorer than themselves-- the "Palestinians," who lived in an even tinier, poorer territory-- the West Bank and Gaza. Israel was no longer viewed as a brave David facing a huge, greedy Goliath that wouldn't let it keep its tiny piece of the pie. Israel was itself the greedy Goliath who had swallowed the whole pie and left nothing for its helpless opponent.

Whether or not historic facts better fit this or that narrative is irrelevant. The new narrative presented huge diplomatic, political, and psychological problems for Israel and Israelis. Israel's friends watched helplessly as they lost world sympathy, while Arabs and their friends exulted as they basked in the world's newfound respect and verbal support.

However, Israeli society eventually proved flexible enough to adapt to the new situation. In fact, the "Palestinian" narrative came to be accepted to a large degree by most of the elite public, which adjusted its political and diplomatic positions accordingly. Furthermore, Israelis eventually found they could live with being disliked or even hated.

Although the opponents of Zionism celebrated their victory, it has proven rather hollow. In the ensuing decades Israel has thrived, even in the face of wide and deep hostility. There are nearly three times as many Jews living in Israel than there were before 1967. Israel has grown from a charity case dependent on foreign aid to a dynamic, respected export dynamo. The military has widened its technical and tactical superiority over its enemies.

In most ways Israel's culture has become richer, more open, and more self-confident. Unlike the solipcistic, provincial Israelis of the 1950s and 1960s, with their black-and-white world views, today's Israelis can see and respect the Other's point of view and try to accomodate it. As any therapist knows, admitting that one shares the blame does not weaken self-respect; if anything, it strengthens it.

So, Israel has not especially suffered from the great propaganda defeat of the 1970s. Have the Arabs or Palestinians benefited from their victory? That depends on what they wished to achieve. The emotional goal of destroying Israel seems to have slipped even farther out of reach, as explained above. True, a few thousand Palestinian Arab leaders won jobs, prestige, moderate wealth, and even a certain degree of power. But for the masses, the pro-Palestinian era in world politics has brought neither peace, prosperity, or personal security.

It may be that the goal of an independent Palestinian State west of the Jordan River has actually gotten in the way of the more fundamental goal of getting out from under Israeli rule and living in peace. Israel made peace with Egypt more than thirty years ago in exchange for territory. Nearly every Israeli government has been willing to negotiate a similar land-for-peace deal with Syria; when the time is right, it will happen. The obvious parallel for the West Bank would be a return to Jordanian rule--Israel is already at peace with Jordan. It wouldn't be easy to work out. It would have been much easier in 1977, when few Jews lived in the West Bank, but it might be easier than trying to carve out two viable states in the absurdly tiny territory between the river and the sea. It's not what most Palestinians want; but do they want the present situation to continue indefinitely?

When Sadat come to Jerusalem that year, the Jordanian option had effectively been removed, thanks to the political victories of the PLO and its supporters. Without those "victories," Sadat and Begin might well have been able to work out a comprehensive settlement. The Palestinian leadership, unfortunately, was too flush with its recent political victories; considering the unwavering support from the Soviets and from the entire "Third World," the PLO may have imagined it could just bide its time and wait for total victory. Only a handful of West Bank notables accepted Begin and Sadat's joint invitation to participate in the peace process-- and a few of those brave individuals were assassinated by the PLO for their pains.

In 1977 Jordan was a stable country with 55 years of history behind it; it is still stable 32 years later. It is also relatively prosperous, and offers its citizens a high degree of personal security and individual freedom. There are many reasons why life in the West Bank and Gaza is, by contrast, poor, unstable, and violent; but whatever the cause, it is unlikely that the fractious leaderships of Fatah and Hamas can possibly evolve in the foreseeable future into a coherent, functioning government. More likely, we can expect recurring waves of infighting among Palestinians and violence between Palestinians and Israelis.

Is it too late to turn back the clock and explore the Jordanian option? I think it's worth a try--especially if it is relabeled as a Jordanian-Palestinian option. Unfortunately, there may be too many people with a vested interest in perpetuating the Palestinian narrative to allow this other option to emerge. It would be a shame if their interests trumped the interests of two or three million living, breathing Palestinians.

credo--reasoned unreason

Start by knowing yourself. Try to understand what is important to you, and why.

Admit that you are not objective concerning your values, goals, and faith. Admit that you are a non-rational being who cares deeply about things that cannot be proved, since all values and all faiths are fundamentally non-rational. Accept that millions of people have other values, even ones that compete with your own.

What, then, is the point of rational discourse? Why bother speaking clearly and making careful distinctions?

Because:
a) most people share some of your values, sometimes more than you or they realize; if you can clarify this, you may be able to avoid needless conflict
b) those with common values may be willing to consider better ways of achieving common goals

I believe my values and goals are strong enough to be advanced and defended honestly, by careful use of facts and reason. I am not afraid to "admit" that I and other people with my values are fallible and ethically tainted. So is everyone else. The more we admit, the better. Let all minds be open for view; yours may be uglier than mine.